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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: OBSCENITY -
SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL STATUTES
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . .
In 1957 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press.2 Nonetheless, states have continuously met
with frustration when trying to define or enforce obscenity
statutes. Oklahoma is no exception.
In Ramirez v. State3 the defendant had been convicted
of the crime of exhibiting an obscene motion picture. The only
testimony offered by the state was that of the arresting of-
ficer; however, the film was shown to the jury. After receiv-
ing the trial court's instructions the jurors were left to specu-
late as to the obscenity of the film. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the state failed to show that the
film appealed to prurient interests because: (1) the issues of
fact were not properly presented to the jury and (2) the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the verdict of the jury, as
the only evidence introduced was the film itself.4
This case, following closely Holding v. Nesbitt5 and Blank-
enship v. Holding6, has virtually left Oklahoma without any
statutes to deal with obscenity. The latter two cases held the
provisions of the Oklahoma Literature Act unconstitutional
for attempting an administrative ban of literature before judi-
cial determination of obscenity, and for vagueness. The prob-
lem in the past has usually been one of definition, but Okla-
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3 Ramirez v. State, 430 P.2d 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967).
4 Id.
5 Holding v. Nesbitt, 387 U.S. 94 (1967).
6 Blankenship v. Holding, 387 U.S. 95 (1967).
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homa has a constitutionally acceptable definition.7 The prob-
lem in Ramirez was a procedural one. The court held that the
arresting officer's testimony did not show in any manner how
the complained of film fell within the definition of "obscene".8
The state did not attempt to show that the motion picture ap-
pealed to the officer's prurient interests, nor did the state at-
tempt to show that it appealed to the prurient interests of
the spectators present in the theater when the officer viewed
it. Instead, the film was shown to the jury who were left to
speculate as to the film's obscenity. There was no evidentiary
basis upon which the jury could recognize any appeal to the
prurient interests of any class of people.9 The jury had no
means of judging the film in terms of prurient interests other
than by their own independent understanding of these terms.
Because the jury was given no basis for understanding ex-
actly how and why the film appealed to its audience, it readily
determined by its own value judgment the film to have
"prurient appeal."'10 The court indicated that if the state had
called as witnesses the people viewing the film when the
arresting officer was present, and by direct testimony estab-
lished that the film appealed to their prurient interests, that
the conviction would have been sustained.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, said:
Courts are often presented with procedurally b a d
cases, and, in dealing with them appear to be acquiescing
in the dissemination of obscenity. But, if the cases were
' OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.9 (1966 supp.).
"Obscene literature" shall mean any literature which, con-
sidered as a whole in the light of contemporary standards,
has as its predominant theme an appeal to prurient interests.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.12 (1966 supp.).
"Obscene" means that to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material as a whole appeals to prurient interests.
8 430 P.2d at 827.
9 Id. at 828.
10 Id. at 829.
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well prepared and were conducted with the appropriate
safeguards, courts would not hesitate to enforce the laws
against obscenity. Thus enforcement agencies must realize
there is no royal road to enforcement; hard and conscienti-
ous work is required."
This statement indicates the fault lies with the enforcement
agencies and the prosecuting attorneys. However, the guide-
lines supplied by the court are vague, and attempts by the
various states to provide practical standards frequently have
been struck down on various constitutional grounds.
New York may have found the answer with its "variable
obscenity" laws, which have been upheld by the Supreme
Court.1 2 These laws restrict the sale of obscene material to
minors on the basis of definitions of obscenity drawn express-
ly with minors in mind. The responsibility and authority of
the state are greater and its power more extensive when it
legislates for the protection of children. This is because chil-
dren may be denied the constitutional right of access to com-
munication as children may, in the exercise of that right, be
damaged to a greater degree than adults.13 The New York
statute reads ". . . posed or presented in such a manner as to
exploit lust of persons under the age of 18 or to their curiosity
as to sex or to the anatomical differences between sexes .... ,,14
Oklahoma's present definition of obscenity falls within
the approved definitional guidelines which have been upheld
by the Court, and would be sufficiently definitive for adults.15
Revamping of our obscenity laws with new ideas and old
safeguards is required. There must be:
1. Legislative consideration of the possibility of variable
obscenity definitions.
1 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964), q u o t e d in
Ramirez v. State, 430 P.2d 826, 830 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967).
12 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Is Id.
14 N.Y. PENA LAw § 484-i (McKinney 1967).
15 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Oklahoma's
definition is similar to the one suggested in Roth.
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2. Procedural preparation and preciseness.
3. An adversary proceeding to see if the material meets
the standards.16
4. A licensing board for movies which must either grant
a license or get a restraining order to prevent the show-
ing within a certain period of time.17
5. Avoidance of prior restraint in literature. 8
In the past state courts have been reluctant to deal with
the problem of obscenity, either choosing to dismiss it on pro-
cedural grounds, or leaving the ultimate decision to the higher
courts. The courts try to avoid this area because they do not
desire to appear to be approving of obscenity. The first step
must be taken by the legislatures in the drafting of new ob-
scenity statutes. The ultimate fate of the statutes will remain
with the courts. As always, the answer to the problem must
depend on whether the method adopted for coping with ob-
scenity is kept within the narrowest bounds necessitated by
the situation in order not to impinge on the full measure of
guarantees afforded by the first amendment.
Russell Cobb, III
16 Holding v. Nesbitt, 387 U.S. 94 (1967).
17 See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
18 See, e.g., Bantam Book v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 558 (1963).
A state juvenile delinquency commission made "informal"
recommendations to book distributors as to which publica-
tions were objectionable for sale to youths, which recom-
mendations were followed up by threats of court action,
visits from the police, etc., and distributors were given no
notice or hearing before their publications were listed ob-
jectionable; Court held that compliance by distributors with
commission's directions was not voluntary and constituted
censorship.
But cf. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
A state-instigated civil suit to determine whether a publica-
tion is obscene, and following such determination an injunc-
tion against any further publication or sale, is an acceptable
procedure. The injunction after judicial determination is
not a prior restraint because it does not put the bookseller
in the predicament of not knowing whether his sale of a
book may subject him to criminal prosecution.
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